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1.1  In the early 1990s, Argentina underwent one of the most ambitious infrastructure 
privatization programs in Latin America. From 1989 onwards, the Federal monopoly, 
electricity companies, and natural gas monopoly were all restructured and privatized. 
Over the same period, concessions were awarded for most of the country's railroad 
network, and about a third of the national road network, as well as several ports and 
airports. The Provinces rapidly followed suit with about a dozen of them awarding 
concessions for electricity distribution and water and sewerage services, including those 
in the Metropolitan Area. Overall, Argentina captured 11 percent of private sector capital 
flows to developing countries worldwide during the 1990s, more than any other 
developing country in the world except for Brazil. One of the factors facilitating private 
participation in the Argentine infrastructure sectors was the Convertibility Law of 1991 
which fixed the peso against the dollar at a rate of one to one, so that infrastructure tariffs 
could effectively be expressed in dollars. The abandonment of the convertibility regime 
at the end of 2001, led to the Emergency Law 2002 that converted infrastructure tariffs 
back from dollars into pesos at a rate of one to one, and froze them in nominal terms even 
as the peso lost 70 percent of its dollar value, and domestic wholesale prices rose by 90 
percent. Following the crisis, a renegotiation process was initiated with infrastructure 
concessionaires, whose final results are not yet known. 
1.2  The infrastructure reforms of the 1990s did not fully take into account the 
sensitive social nature of these services, and hence did not incorporate a comprehensive 
framework of social policy measures to address these concerns. Although a number of 
social policy funds were established at the time, they were designed primarily to promote 
territorial integration rather than poverty alleviation. Examples include the national 
electricity fund and the Patagonian gas fund. This omission gradually led to a growing 
number of ad hoc social policy initiatives in the infrastructure sectors, in order to meet 
the emerging social concerns of the moment. These included a universal access surcharge 
for water and sanitation in the Metropolitan Area, as well as a wide range of Provincial 
social tariff initiatives. However, all of these mechanisms are partial in their geographic 
coverage, so that many jurisdictions lack any kind of social policy instrument. Overall it 
is estimated that Argentina currently spends around US$200 million per year on social 
policies for the infrastructure sector, yet in spite of this lacks a coherent social policy 
framework for these services. 
1.3  The absence of a social policy for the infrastructure sectors has become 
particularly pressing since the onset of a severe economic and social crisis since the late 
1990s, that was considerably exacerbated by the collapse of the convertibility regime. 
GDP has fallen by 20 percent since its last peak in 1998, with 10.9 percent of this decline 
coming in 2002 alone. Due to a combination of recession and devaluation, GDP per  
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capita has declined from US$8,210 in 1998 to US$ 2,695 in 2002. As a result, the urban 
poverty rate that was already at 29% in 1998 had risen to 58% by 2002. Moreover, 
unemployment has risen from 13 percent in 1998 to 22 percent in 2002. Compared with 
other major economic crisis of the 1990s, the Argentine crisis is second only to Indonesia 
in terms of decline in GDP and manufacturing wages, and is the worst in terms of 
increases in poverty and unemployment rates. Such loss of purchasing power on the part 
of many families evidently creates difficulties with keeping-up payments for essential 
infrastructure services. Demand for declined by 10 percent for utility services and 15-20 
percent for urban transport services  in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. Moreover, 
survey results indicate that 40% of households were falling behind in the payment of 
bills, and around 10% had been disconnected from electricity and telephone services. 
1.4  In response to the omission, the present study aims to provide the empirical basis 
for the construction of a more coherent and better-targeted social policy framework for 
the infrastructure services in Argentina. To this end, the paper evaluates the distributional 
performance of current social policy instruments and simulates the implementation of 




2. EVALUATING THE NEED FOR A SOCIAL POLICY 
 
2.1  There are two basic justifications for social policy intervention in the 
infrastructure sectors. First, access to basic services is considered essential to achieve a 
minimum level of household welfare; without adequate sanitation, for example, it is 
difficult to sustain good health. Second, it is known that access to basic services provides 
a platform that helps families to escape from poverty; for example, by facilitating labor 
force participation via improved health or reduced time spent on domestic chores such as 
collection of water and wood, or by expanding possibilities for household-based micro-
enterprises. 
2.2  In order to define the priorities of any social policy for the infrastructure sectors, 
it is important to begin with an empirical analysis to identify the areas of most pressing 
social need. In many countries, governments set themselves the objective of providing 
universal access to infrastructure services, often defined as universal service coverage at 
affordable prices that enable all citizens to cover their basic consumption requirements. 
To evaluate the extent to which this objective has been met in today’s Argentina, the 
study examines household survey data on coverage and expenditure across the income 
spectrum. 
ACCESS 
2.3  Household data on service coverage show that access to electricity in Argentina is 
almost universal, both in the Metropolitan Area and in the provinces (Figure 1). As far as 
telecommunications are concerned, universal coverage has also been reached, since 
although only 72% of households have a private telephone, 97% live within 10 blocks of 
a public telephone service, which is considered to be an adequate substitute.  
2.4  A significant coverage deficit, however, still remains for water and sewerage. In 
the case of water, the deficit is concentrated in the Metropolitan Area where 15% of 
households currently lack the service, in contrast to the provinces where the service is 
already virtually universal. In the case of sewerage, 30% of the population nationwide 
still lack access to this service. Given the importance of these services from a public 
health perspective, there is a clear justification for making coverage expansion a central 
element of the country’s infrastructure social policy. 
2.5  Finally, the natural gas service also presents a significant coverage deficit with 
coverage levels of around 70% nationwide. LPG cylinders provide a widely available 
substitute for this service, however it is five times more expensive than natural gas per 
equivalent unit of energy. Ironically, its usage is concentrated among the lowest income 
groups, which are often unable to finance the US$53 connection charge for natural gas, as  
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well as the US$237-474 conversion costs within the household. There is thus a potential 
justification for making the expansion of natural gas coverage a second element of any 
infrastructure social policy for Argentina. 
Figure 1: Access to utilities by income quintile in Metropolitan Area and the Provinces 
  (a) Metropolitan Area      (b)Provinces 
Source: OPSM, May 2002 
2.6  As regards public transport services in the Metropolitan Area, the household 
survey revealed that 98% of those interviewed (and 93% of those in the first income 
quintile) had access to the public transport network within 10 blocks of their home
2. 
Furthermore, respondents indicated that 76% of those using public transport are able to 
reach their workplace with a single public transport journey
3. Both results confirm the 
virtual universality of coverage of the public transport network in the Metropolitan Area, 
and suggest that the high proportion of heads of low income households that commute on 
foot do so for economic reasons, and not due to lack of physical access to public 
transportation. 
AFFORDABILITY 
2.7  Another potential social policy concern for the infrastructure sectors arises where 
a significant segment of the population cannot afford to pay for a basic subsistence basket 
of utility services. This assessment is based on the share of the family budget that is 
devoted to infrastructure services. 
2.8  The last official family expenditure survey in Argentina dates back to 1996/97. 
Although this information is evidently outdated and unrepresentative of current economic 
conditions, it nonetheless provides a helpful longer-term point of reference under more 
‘normal’ circumstances. According to the 1997 survey, utility services on average 
                                                 
2 The results for the provinces are plus or minus one percentage point from the results for the Metropolitan 
Area.  
3At the national level, this percentage rises to 83%.   
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absorbed 6.7% of the family budget, with the share ranging from 11.3% for the bottom 
quintile to 5.0% for the top quintile (Figure 2(a) and Table A1 from the Annex).
4  
2.9  A household survey commissioned for the present study in November 2002 
provides more recent evidence on the structure of household expenditure. 
Notwithstanding some methodological differences with the earlier family expenditure 
survey, a comparison between these two sources remains informative. The new survey 
shows that utility services are currently absorbing 13.4% of family budgets on average, 
with the share ranging from 16.2% for the bottom quintile and 11.5% for the top quintile. 
On average, this represents a doubling of the budget shares observed in 1997, although 
for the bottom quintile the increase is only 40% (Figure 2(b) and Table A1 from the 
Annex). 
2.10  Furthermore, if current expenditure is expressed as a percentage of average 
income for each quintile, the share absorbed by the utilities changes to 11.4% on average, 
but as much as 22.1% of income for the bottom quintile and only 6.8% of income for the 
top quintile (Table A1). These differences between budget share and income share are 
explained by the fact that low-income households tend to spend considerably more than 
their monthly income (US$123 versus US$97.2), leading to much higher shares when 
income is used in the denominator. For higher income households, the opposite is true, 
with expenditure being substantially lower than income (US$358.2 versus US$559.5). 
2.11  Two factors explain the increase in budget share observed between 1997 and 
2002. The first is the indexation of utility tariffs to the US CPI, during a period in which 
US CPI accumulated 10 percentage points of growth as against a two-percentage point 
fall in the Argentine CPI. The second factor is the recent decline in per capita incomes, 




Figure 2: Affordability of utility services by quintile nationwide 
                                                 
4 Throughout the study results will be compared across quintiles of per capita household income  
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         (a) Family Expenditure Survey 1997         (b)OPSM, 2002 
Source: Family Expenditure Survey, May 1997 and OPSM, November 2002 
2.12  Beyond observed expenditure patterns, another helpful point of reference is the 
cost of a subsistence basket of utility services (see Table A2 of the Annex). The 
subsistence monthly basket is defined as the minimum unmeasured monthly tariff for 
water and sewerage, plus the cost of 120 Kwh per month of electricity, a natural gas 
consumption of 55 cubic meters in summer and between 65 and 295 cubic meters in 
winter depending on the latitude, and 100 minutes of public telephone calls. 
2.13  At current prices, the cost of the subsistence basket comes to US$16.6 per month, 
which represents on average 7.6% of the family budget or 6.5% of family income 
nationwide. For households in the bottom quintile, the subsistence basket would absorb 
12.5% of the family budget but 17.1% of the family income. For households in the 
second quintile, the cost of the basket represents 9.1% of the family budget or 9.3% of 
the family income. Once again this result throws into relief the divergence between 
income and expenditure for first quintile households, which means that utility 
expenditure represents a relatively high share when expressed in terms of income. 
Comparing actual expenditure shares against those associated with the subsistence basket 
reveals that low-income households are actually spending significantly more on utility 
services than the subsistence basket would suggest, particularly on gas and electricity. 
2.14  While there are no scientific parameters to determine the maximum amount that a 
household ‘should’ spend on utility services, international experience suggests that a 
share of 10%-15% of household income is typical and can be considered ‘reasonable’. 
Hence, a reasonable objective for infrastructure social policy might be to prevent low-
income families from needing to spend more than 15% of their incomes to meet 
subsistence requirements of water, sanitation, electricity and natural gas. The above 
analysis indicated that first quintile households in Argentina are currently above this 
level, spending 22.1% of their income, or the equivalent of 17.1% for subsistence needs, 
and can therefore be considered to present an affordability problem. The situation of 
second quintile households, on the other hand, is not so critical given that they can meet 
subsistence requirements with 9.3% of their income, and currently spend 15.7% of their 
                                                                                                                                                 
constructed at the national level.   
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income on the utilities. The implication is that any social policy aimed at subsidizing the 
cost of a subsistence basket of services need probably only focus on the poorest of the 
poor. 
2.15  Regarding expenditure on public transport services, it is important to note that 
comparisons between the 1997 and 2002 household expenditure surveys are complicated 
by the fact that the former survey lumps together expenditure on public and private 
transportation (Figure 3). Nevertheless, since vehicle ownership is concentrated in the 
upper end of the income distribution, this need not represent a major problem for 
comparing the expenditure patterns of the poor. A more serious limitation is that the 2002 
survey only reports transport expenditure for commuting journeys of the head of 
household, and thereby represents only a lower bound on public transport spending. A 
comparison between the two surveys shows that the budget share of public transport 
services more than doubled between 1997 and 2002. It rose from an average share of 
4.3% in the 1997 survey to 8.1% in the 2002 (even though the latter only includes 
commuting journeys for the head of household). This jump is largely explained by the 
fact that public transport tariffs rose between 35% and 40% in real terms since 1997, 
while per capita household income fell by a third over the same period.                            
Figure 3: Affordability of public transport in the Metropolitan Area 
Source: Family Expenditure Survey, May 1997 and OPSM, November 2002 
2.16  Nevertheless, the situation of the first quintile stands out as being somewhat 
different, given that the expenditure share did not change significantly, due to a fall of 
30% in the absolute level of expenditure. Survey evidence shows that this reduction is 
associated with substitution away from public transport towards ‘free’ modes of travel, 
such as walking and cycling. Indeed, in the Metropolitan Area only 28% of first quintile 
households commuted on public transport, as against 60% that used bicycles or 














































































Figure 4: Modal pattern for commuting journeys in the Metropolitan Area  
Source: OPSM, November 2002 
2.17  Finally, since the demand for urban transport services is a derived demand for 
other services such as education, health, shopping and leisure, it is harder to come-up 
with a meaningful concept of subsistence. Furthermore, since the 2002 survey was not 
able to collect information on journeys other than those related to head of household 
commuting, there is no real information base for deriving a subsistence concept. 
Therefore, the cost of one typical round trip commuting journey per day is used here as a 
very simple approximation to the subsistence concept. This amounts to US$0.67 per day 
or US$14.9 per month, which is almost 25% more than what the first quintile heads of 
household are currently spending, given their observed tendency to switch out of public 
transport. 
SUMMARY 
2.18  In summary, this evaluation of social policy needs would appear to provide 
support for a universal access policy aimed at expanding coverage of water services in 
the Metropolitan Area sewerage services nationwide, and possibly also natural gas 
services. This could be achieved via subsidies aimed at reducing connection costs, and/or 
the cost of complementary investments within the household. This can be regarded as a 
long-term policy objective, whose justification is independent of the economic crisis that 
afflicted the country in 2002. 
2.19  At the same time, infrastructure services that were reasonably affordable to all 
back in 1997, have recently become very expensive in relation to the income of 
households in the first quintile. This changing situation is attributable both to rising prices 
and falling real incomes. This implies the need to develop social policy mechanisms to 
maintain the cost of the subsistence basket within an affordable range for the poorest 
households, particularly given the prospect of upward tariff adjustments to compensate 
infrastructure service providers for the devaluation of the peso.  
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3. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1  The development of a social policy framework capable of meeting the objectives 
defined above, requires an empirical evaluation of the efficacy of current social policies 
as well as the potential for improvement from the adoption of alternative instruments. 
This analysis will be based on the household survey undertaken specifically for the 
current study, and will make use of analytical techniques developed in the income 
distribution literature. 
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 
3.2  The empirical analysis will be based on the household survey conducted by 
OPSM in May 2002. The survey covered 2,505 households distributed across 39 
localities nationwide with more than 5,000 inhabitants. The survey is representative of 
urban areas at the national level, and also at the level of the Metropolitan Area and the 
five major regions of the interior. The sampling errors is plus or minus 1.96% at the 
national level, and plus or minus 5.0% at the regional level. 
3.3  The most innovative aspect of the survey is the combination of expenditure data 
and consumption patterns for infrastructure services with data on household income and 
socioeconomic characteristics. In this sense, the survey can be contrasted both with utility 
customer databasesthat offer extensive information on consumption patterns without 
any accompanying information on socioeconomic characteristics of the householdand 
national household surveysthat offer extensive information on socioeconomic 
characteristics without reporting expenditure patterns on utility services
5. 
3.4  In November 2002, OPSM conducted a second household survey with wider 
poverty measurement objectives, which collected detailed information on the structure of 
household expenditure, including expenditure on infrastructure services. 
MEASURING CONSUMPTION 
3.5  The following procedure was adopted to estimate consumption of infrastructure 
services from the survey data. First, for the 25%-35% of households that were able to 
provide the interviewer with a copy of their utility bill, the level of consumption could be 
                                                 
5 The family expenditure survey of 1997 was the last to provide official data for expenditure on utility 
services. However, even this survey does not present a very detailed breakdown given that expenditures are 
presented in four broad categories, namely: water and electricity combined, telephone and post combined, 
fuels and transportation.   
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read directly from the bill (Table 1). Second, a further 30% of households were unwilling 
or unable to show their utility bills to the interviewer, but were able to recall the value of 
their most recent monthly bill. In these cases, the local utility tariff structure was applied 
to the reported expenditure in order to infer the physical consumption of the service. For 
the remaining 35% to 45% who neither presented bills nor recalled expenditure, 
imputation techniques were used to infer expenditure based on household characteristics. 
3.6  Some evidence of selectivity effects was found with regard to the sub-sample that 
provided coherent information on household expenditure. Both for water and electricity, 
high-income households were more often able to report expenditure. In the case of water, 
this may simply reflect higher rates of service coverage in the upper income quintiles. 
However, in the case of electricity, where coverage is practically universal, this 
explanation is no longer relevant. 
Table 1: Summary of data availability on utilities expenditure 
  Water Electricity Gas  Telephone 
Percentage of households that showed bill  27.9  35.4  26.5  23.7 
Percentage of households that verbally reported expenditures 29.7  29.8  30.4  28.7 
Percentage of households that did neither of the above  42.4  34.8  43.1  47.6 
 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: OPSM, May 2002 
 
3.7  Nonetheless, these data limitations in practice do not materially circumscribe the 
conclusions of this analysis. In reality, expenditure data were only used to evaluate the 
efficacy of existing social policies in the Metropolitan Area (for the cases of water, 
sewerage, electricity, and public transport) and Patagonia (for the case of natural gas). 
The analysis of social policies for water and electricity in the provinces is based solely on 
the socioeconomic characteristics of the households, without reference to expenditure 
levels. Furthermore, expenditure data were not used at all in the simulations of alternative 
social policies, which are based entirely on normative criteria for subsistence 
consumption, or depend solely on the socioeconomic characteristics of the household. 
ANALYTICAL TOOLS 
3.8  Using data from the 2002 survey, it is possible to identify the beneficiaries of 
current social policy mechanisms in the infrastructure sectors, and evaluate how well 
targeted they are. This is done by examining the extent to which they reach households 
that live under the official poverty  (and extreme poverty) lines, which currently stand at 
US$65.7 (and US$27.7) per adult equivalent per month. In a similar fashion, it is possible 
to identify the impact of applying alternative social policy instruments, and examine their 
pattern of incidence. 
3.9  The evaluation of the targeting properties of current and potential, future social 
policy instruments are based on a number of standard indicators adapted from the income  
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distribution literature. First, a simple graphical representation is made showing what 
percentage of the total subsidy is captured by each of the income quintiles. 
3.10  Second, the errors of inclusion and exclusion are calculated, in order to assess the 
degree to which the subsidy reaches the target population (see Table 2). The error of 
inclusion identifies the percentage of subsidy beneficiaries that are not genuinely poor, 
and hence should not be receiving the subsidy. The error of exclusion identifies the 
percentage of the poor who do not receive the subsidy, even though they should.  
3.11  The third indicator is the quasi Gini coefficient, also known as the concentration 
coefficient (see Table 3). Similar to the Gini coefficient, the quasi Gini summarizes in a 
single number the overall progressivity or regressivity of the subsidy distribution. This 
coefficient is bounded within an interval from negative to positive one. Positive values 
indicate regressivity, or a pro-rich distribution of the subsidy. Negative values indicate 
progressivity, or a pro-poor distribution of the subsidy. A zero value indicates a 


















Table 2: Understanding Errors of Inclusion and Exclusion 
 
A key consideration in evaluating the efficacy of subsidies is measuring to what extent they succeed in 
reaching the poor. Two standard indicators are commonly used for this purpose; known as errors of exclusion 
and inclusion.  
 
The following diagram helps to illustrate the meaning of these terms. The diagram divides the general 
population into two groups: poor (P) and non-poor (NP). A subset of this overall population are beneficiaries 
of a subsidy program (B). Since it is never possible to direct subsidies perfectly towards the target population, 

















Errors of exclusion (EE) arise when people who are genuinely poor fail to receive the subsidy. The error is 
defined as the percentage of the poor who do not receive any subsidy. In terms of the areas drawn in the 
diagram, this can be expressed as: EE=1-(BP /P ). Errors of exclusion could be regarded as an even more 
serious problem than errors of inclusion, since they indicate that the subsidy is failing to meet its primary 
objective of helping the poor.  
 
Errors of inclusion (EI) arise when people who are not poor benefit from the subsidy. The error is defined as 
the percentage of subsidy beneficiaries who are not poor. In terms of the areas drawn in the diagram, this can 
be expressed as: EI=BNP /B. Errors of inclusion are essentially a form of inefficiency, because they represent 
a leakage of subsidy funds towards a subset of the population that doesn’t really need them. 
 
Related to the error of inclusion, it is also interesting to calculate the leakage rate, which is the percentage of 
subsidy resources that are captured by the non-poor. The leakage rate tends to follow a similar pattern to the 
errors of inclusion, however if non-poor beneficiaries consume relatively large amounts of water compared to 
poor beneficiaries, then the leakage rate may be even higher than the error of inclusion. 
 
Finally, it is interesting to note that errors of inclusion and exclusion tend to move in opposite directions. Thus, 
a subsidy with very high errors of inclusion will typically have relatively low errors of exclusion and vice 
versa. This happens because it is difficult to identify the poor, so that to be sure of reaching most of them very 
broad eligibility criteria are required; which in turn brings in a large number of non-poor. The implication is 
that to be sure of reaching the majority of the poor, it is often inevitable that there is a considerable amount of 
subsidy resources ‘wasted’ on the not so poor. 
 
 
P. Poor NP. Non-poor
B. Subsidy beneficiaries
BP. Poor BNP. Non-poor  
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Table 3: An Introduction to Gini Coefficients 
 
In addition to looking at errors of inclusion and exclusion, it is important to understand the overall pattern of  
subsidy incidence across the full spectrum of rich and poor. A simple way of doing this is to rank the total 
population from richest to poorest, and then plot a Lorenz curve which shows the percentage of subsidy that 
is captured by the poorest X percent of the population. 
 
Equal distribution. If the distribution of the subsidy was equal across the population, then the poorest 20% 
of the population would receive 20% of the subsidy, the poorest 50% would receive 50% of the subsidy, and 
so on so that the Lorenz curve would essentially be equivalent to the 45
0 line shown in the diagram. Such a 
distribution is neither pro-poor nor pro-rich, since everyone essentially gets the same amount. 
 
Regressive (or pro-rich) distribution. The first Lorenz curve plotted in the diagram (LC1) represents a 
situation where the poorest 20% of the population receives only 5% of the total subsidy, while the poorest 
50% receives only 15% of the total subsidy. As a result, the Lorenz curve bows down below the 45
0 line, 
indicating that the distribution is regressive, or pro-rich. 
 
Progressive (or pro-poor) distribution. The second Lorenz curve plotted in the diagram (LC2) represents a 
situation where the poorest 20% of the population receive 60% of the total subsidy, while the poorest 50% 
receives 90% of the total subsidy. As a result, the Lorenz curve bows up above the 45
0 line, indicating that 
the distribution is progressive, or pro-poor. 
 
For convenience, it is typical to summarize the shape of the Lorenz curve in a single indicator known as a 
quasi-Gini coefficient (QGC). The quasi-Gini coefficient is defined as the area underneath the 45
0 line down 
as far as the Lorenz Curve, divided by the whole area of the triangle under the 45
0 line. Thus, for the first 
Lorenz curve (LC1) the quasi-Gini coefficient is defined as: QGC=A1/T. When the Lorenz curve bows up 
above the  45
0 line, the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45
0 line is deemed to be negative. Hence, for 
the second Lorenz curve (LC2) the quasi-Gini coefficient is defined as: QGC=–A2/T. 
 
The quasi-Gini coefficient is bounded between –1 and +1, with an intermediate value of zero. A quasi-Gini 
of zero essentially indicates that the Lorenz curve lies right on top of the 45
0 line. A quasi-Gini close to +1, 
means that the distribution of the subsidy is very pro-rich, so that the Lorenz curve is bowing out almost to 
the edges of the triangle and almost 100% of the subsidy is going to the richest few people in the society. On 
the other hand, a quasi-Gini close to –1, means that the distribution of the subsidy is very pro-poor, so that 
the Lorenz curve is bowing out to make almost a triangle above the 45
0 line and almost 100% of the subsidy 
is going to the poorest few people in the society. 
 
Gini coefficients are also commonly used to measure the distribution of income in a society, and in this case 
they can only take values between 0 and +1, since it is (by definition) impossible for the poorest 20% of the 

















4. EVALUATION OF EXISTING SOCIAL POLICIES 
 
4.1  An important starting point is to understand the extent to which existing social 
policies in the infrastructure sectors succeed in transferring resources to poorer 
households. Accordingly, this section provides a brief characterization of the existing 
policies and presents evidence as to their distributional incidence. 
WATER AND SEWERAGE 
4.2  There is no national social policy framework for the water and sewerage sector, 
thus each jurisdiction has developed its own social policy elements. 
OSN Formula  
4.3  Due to the low coverage of household meters in Argentina, most water utilities 
make use of an unmeasured tariff formula developed during the period of the former 
national state monopoly: Obras Sanitarias de la Nación. The formula has been adapted to 
differing degrees by different jurisdictions following the decentralization of the water 
sector in the 1980s. However, in most cases, it remains a polynomial formula that 
weights a number of characteristics of the dwelling, such as the size of the plot, the 
proportion of the plot that is constructed upon, the quality of the construction, and the 
facilities of the neighborhood. The underlying notion is that these variables serve as 
proxies both for the socio-economic level of the household and for its likely water 
consumption.  
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Figure 5: Correlation between water charge and income level in metro area 
Source: OPSM, May 2002 
4.4  For the concrete case of Aguas Argentinas, the utility serving the Metropolitan 
Area of Buenos Aires, there were sufficient data points to evaluate the extent to which the 
corresponding version of the OSN-derived formula is correlated with household income
6. 
The data do not reveal any strong relationship between household income and the water 
tariff paid by different categories of customer, such as those with and without sewerage 
services, or those living in houses or apartments (R1 versus R2) (Figure 5). Indeed, the 
simple correlation between the OSN-derived formula and household income is found to 
be around 33%.  
4.5  Nevertheless, a more thorough analysis shows that the variables that make-up the 
OSN formula themselves contain valuable information about the income level of the 
household. Statistical techniques can be used to find the weights that provide the closest 
fit between the variables in the formula and the income level of the household. The result 
shows that the level of correlation could potentially be increased to 80%, albeit via a 
rather unintuitive formula combining 27 quadratic terms and interactions between the 
original variables. 
Universal Access Charge 
4.6  The water utility in the Metropolitan Area has developed a cross-subsidy scheme 
designed to finance the expansion of networks towards low-income neighborhoods. This 
universal service and environmental charge (known as SUMA), arose following a 
renegotiation of the concession contract in 1997. The idea was to substitute the 
previously practiced US$600 infrastructure charge for newly connected households, 
which had proved completely unaffordable for the poorest customers, with a monthly 
                                                 
6 This analysis is based on data from water bills of 51 households representing 7.5% of the population of 
the Metropolitan Area.   
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fixed charge of US$1.65 applied to all the bills of existing customers. The universal 
access charge thereby introduced a cross subsidy between new and existing customers. At 
the same time, a proportion of the revenues from the universal access charge was 
earmarked to finance wastewater treatment. However, the link between the universal 
access charge revenues and the company’s investment program was subsequently broken, 
so that the new charge simply became an additional component of the utility’s income 
stream with no specific application. 
4.7  Nonetheless, it is interesting to evaluate the distributional incidence of the 
universal access charge under the original concept of a social policy designed to finance 
new connections. This is done by means of a five-year simulation during which the 
proportion of the universal access charge relating to universal access is applied to the 
general customer base, and the resulting revenues are used to finance a subsidy to water 
and sewerage connections. The simulation takes into account the fact that the low-income 
households newly incorporated into the customer base at the outset of the period must 
themselves pay the universal access charge thereafter. 
Figure 6: Distributional incidence of universal access charge 
Source: OPSM, May 2002 
4.8  The results show that the incidence of the universal access charge is slightly 
skewed towards richer households, with a concentration coefficient of +0.15. On the 
other hand, the distribution of connection subsidies for the water service is skewed 
towards poorer households, with a concentration coefficient of –0.20, reflecting the fact 
that households without water connections are concentrated among the lowest income 
groups. However, the distribution of connection subsidies for the sewerage service is 
relatively egalitarian, with a concentration coefficient of –0.07, due to the fact that 




4.9  A number of Argentina provinces, and most recently the Metropolitan Area, have 
experimented with the introduction of various forms of social tariffs. These amount to 
some 10 cases in all. A brief description of the mechanics of each of these schemes is 
provided in Table A3 of the Appendix but most of them identify beneficiaries based on a 
range of characteristics such as income, housing, location, and assets.   
4.10  The OPSM survey included a special question designed to identify the 
beneficiaries of these schemes, and found that barely 2% of households surveyed claimed 
to be beneficiaries. This result is consistent with what is known about the relatively small 
scope of these schemes, which are estimated to reach no more than 100,000 households 
nationwide. The small number of observations that appear in the survey do not make it 
possible to evaluate the incidence of these schemes directly. However, what can be done 
is to simulate the application of the eligibility criteria for each scheme to the sample of 
the population from the corresponding jurisdiction, in order to assess the extent to which 
these are successful in targeting resources towards the poor. This simulation proves to be 
rather artificial, given that most of these programs use household income as an eligibility 
criteria, and that this is accurately observed in the survey, but may not be so accurately 
measured by these schemes in practice. Consequently, the results obtained should be 
regarded as an optimistic upper bound on the targeting performance of these social tariff 
programs. 
4.11  The results indicate that the eligibility criteria used in the social tariff schemes 
appear to be quite effective at targeting resources towards the poor. In particular, the 
criteria used in the northeastern and northwestern provinces of Argentina (namely, 
Chaco, Formosa, Salta y Tucumán) perform particularly well. Assuming that they are 
able to measure household income as precisely as is done in the survey, the simulation 
suggests that 70% to 90% of the beneficiaries belong to the bottom income quintile 
(Figure 7).  
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Figure 7: Simulated distributional incidence of social tariffs for water 
Source: OPSM, May 2002 
4.12  At the national level, these programs register a concentration coefficient of –0.15, 
indicating a relatively progressive distribution of subsidy. Nonetheless, this average 
conceals a wide variation in performance, ranging from  concentration  coefficients  of       
–0.80 in the northerly province of Formosa to +0.28 in the Metropolitan Area. One 
reason for this may be that poverty in the north of the country tends to be more structural 
in nature, and is thus more closely linked to objectively observable characteristics of the 
household. Whereas, around the metropolitan axis, there is a greater prevalence of 
impoverished middle class households that do not exhibit many of the traditional 
characteristics of poverty, making it more difficult to design successful eligibility criteria. 
In most jurisdictions, the errors of exclusion are above 50%, reaching 73% at the national 
level. However, the errors of inclusion are relatively low, falling generally below 40% 
(Table 4). 
4.13  Another interesting result from the simulations is that the number of households 
that comply with the eligibility criteria is very much higher than the number of 
households that actually receive the social tariff in the corresponding jurisdictions (Table 
4). Indeed, it would currently cost US$46 million per year to provide the social tariff to 
all of the households that appear to meet the eligibility criteria, which is six times more 
than is currently spent on these subsidies. In general, these programs are run on the basis 
of an annual spending ceiling and subsidies are allocated to eligible households on a first-
come first-served basis. In this sense, there would appear to be some rationing going on, 
or alternatively only a small proportion of potentially eligible households are sufficiently 























Metro area  10,000   4,000,000
*           
Federal 
District 
    794,579 19,074,216  73% 0%  +0.28 
Buenos Aires      369,916 11,239,721  10% 68% -0.63 
Mendoza 26,000  1,400,000  153,839  3,692,136 40%  48%  -0.18 
Santa Fe      147,965 6,214,530  40% 7%  -0.18 
Chaco 7,000 41,500  69,244  2,077,320  1%  49%  -0.78 
Salta 20,000  1,200,000  56,223  2,039,892 3%  57%  -0.68 
Santiago 9,500  50,000  20,546  289,970  10%  73%  -0.38 
Formosa 7,300  240,000  10,410  348,526  0%  81%  -0.80 
Tucumán 9,500  250,000  8,879  594,277  29%  96%  -0.14 
Total 89,300
** 7,181,500
** 1,638,209  46,884,000  44%  73%  -0.15 
Notes: 
*Not yet fully utilized; 
**Excludes Santa Fe 
Source: OPSM, May 2002 
ELECTRICITY 
Provinces 
4.14  A national Tariff Compensation Fund has been established for some years in the 
electricity sector. It is financed from 60% of the revenues generated by a surcharge of 
US$0.024/Kwh on all electricity traded through the national wholesale market, which 
amounted to US$98 million in 2002. The Federal Electricity Council distributes these 
resources to the provinces on the basis of a formula that seeks to compensate for 
differences in the cost of electricity production across jurisdictions. The underlying 
principle is hence one of horizontal equity, which seeks to equalize the electricity tariff 
across the country.  
4.15 Notwithstanding  substantial divergence in income levels around the country, the 
fund is not designed to compensate for differences in ability to pay across provinces. It is 
therefore not surprising to find that the proportion of funds transferred to each province 
bares little relationship with the proportion of the country’s poor resident in each 
province (Figure 8). The majority of smaller provinces receive a much higher proportion 
of transfers than would be warranted with the extent of poverty in their jurisdictions. On 
the other hand, the three largest provinces receive scant resources in comparison with the 
extent of poverty that they contain. The most striking example is that of Buenos Aires  
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province, which receives 2% of the resources from the fund, but has 40% of the country’s 
poor. 
Figure 8: Distribution of resources from the national fund against distribution of poor 
Source: OPSM, May 2002 
4.16  Provinces enjoy considerable discretion in the use of these resources. While no 
detailed accounts are kept of how each province employs these transfers, they are in the 
majority of cases used either to subsidize isolated systems, or to compensate industrial 
customers for seasonal price fluctuations, or to finance a variety of social tariff schemes 
(similar to those discussed above for the water sector). A brief summary of the design 
characteristics of these social tariff schemes is provided in Table A4 of the Appendix, 
they typically use consumption levels and poverty indicators to identify eligible 
beneficiaries.   
4.17  Unfortunately, there is not enough detailed information available about the 
distribution of the resources from the tariff compensation fund to permit an evaluation of 
its distributional incidence. However, given that an unknown portion of these resources 
are used to finance social tariff schemes, it is possible to simulate the distributional 
incidence of these schemes, applying a similar methodology to that developed for the 
water sector. As before this constitutes an optimistic upper bound for the targeting 
performance of these schemes, given that household income is more accurately observed 
in the survey than it probably would be in the practical application of the relevant 
eligibility criteria. 
4.18  The results, as for the water case, show a relatively good targeting performance 
(Figure 9), with an overall average concentration coefficient of –0.37, ranging from +0.07 
in the province of Formosa to –0.80 in the province of Salta (Table 5). On the basis of the 
simulation, it is estimated that some 400,000 families nationwide would comply with the 
eligibility criteria for the social tariff in their respective jurisdictions, which would entail 
a national cost of US$18 million per year. As in the case of water, this number probably 
far exceeds the actual number of beneficiaries, however no information is available on  
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the current numbers. Finally, it is important to note that the estimated annual cost is 
barely 20% of the resources raised through the national Tariff Compensation Fund in the 
year 2000. 
Figure 9: Simulated distributional incidence of social tariffs for electricity 
Source: OPSM, May 2002 
 
 
Table 5: Simulation of social tariffs for electricity 























Córdoba      62,894  5,503,731 3,579,100 0%  84%  -0.80 
Catamar     30,362 601,167  6,047,157  45% 0%  -0.23 
Chaco      43,209  2,592,540 2,594,925 19% 75%  -0.43 
Formosa      31,820  2,688,153 5,643,196 45% 65%  +0.07 
Entre 
Rí
    31,762 133,400  3,853,880  32% 83%  -0.42 
Jujuy      38,378  1,586,400 2,702,808 22% 66%  -0.43 
La Rioja      11,184  1,124,237 3,680,017 60% 51%  -0.16 
Mendoza      22,892  1,301,951 2,654,816 77% 97%  -0.03 
Misiones      3,618 108,540 3,723,654  47%  97%  -0.42 
Río 
N
    1,476 106,272 2,717,131  100%  100% 0.00 
Salta      12,909 656,353  2,597,224  0%  90%  -0.80 
San Juan      6,038 144,912 2,868,409  100%  100% 0.00 
San Luis      22,303 441,599  2,886,601  39% 63%  -0.01 
Santa Fe      76,046  1,387,078 1,172,555 74% 93%  +0.12 
Total      394,891  18,376,338 46,721,473 39%  93%  -0.37 
 
Source: OPSM, May 2002  
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GAS 
4.19  The only social policy practiced in the gas sector is the Patagonian subsidy, which 
is designed to compensate households in the country’s coldest region for the relatively 
high heating costs that they face. This is achieved via a discount of around 75% on an 
initial ‘subsistence’ block of natural gas or LPG consumption, that is regionally 
differentiated to reflect climatic conditions, and varies from 62.5 to 1,250 cubic meters 
monthly. This subsidy is financed by a national surcharge of US$0.004 per cubic meter of 
gas sold from the wellhead, which generated US$100 million of revenues in the year 
2002. 
4.20  In common with the national Tariff Compensation Fund for electricity, the 
Patagonian subsidy is based on a principle of horizontal equity across regions, and takes 
no account of ability to pay. In fact, the poverty rate in Patagonia is among the lowest in 
the country. In November 2002, it stood at 37% as against 46% at the national level. 
Moreover, due to this relatively low poverty rate and to its small population, Patagonia 
contains barely 3% of Argentina’s poor households. 
4.21  The distributional incidence of the Patagonian subsidy can be estimated on the 
basis of survey data on natural gas and LPG expenditure in that region (Figure 10)
7. The 
figure illustrates that a relatively small proportion of the beneficiaries and of the benefits 
accrue to the bottom income quintile, but are instead concentrated in the middle quintiles 
of the income distribution. The Patagonian subsidy has an associated error of inclusion of 
around 70%. The error of exclusion is 4% with respect to the total poor resident in the 
Patagonian region. The concentration coefficient is estimated at +0.08, indicating a 
broadly egalitarian but mildly regressive distribution. 
                                                 
7 This exercise is based on expenditure reported by 70 Patagonian households in the OPSM survey, which 
account for 45% of the households surveyed in that region. An important limitation is the fact that the 
survey was undertaken during the summer period. Given that higher income households probably spend 
more on winter heating than lower income households, the distributional incidence for the winter period 
could be significantly more regressive. 
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Figure 10: Distributional incidence of the Patagonian gas subsidy 
Source: OPSM, May 2002 
SUBSIDIES TO PENSIONERS 
4.22  Argentina has a long tradition of subsidizing energy tariffs for low-income 
pensioners, a practice which was preserved through the privatization process of the early 
1990s. Until 1997, this subsidy took the form of a 50% discount on the fixed charge and 
volumetric charge for consumption of up to 210 Kwh per month of electricity in the 
Metropolitan Area. In the case of natural gas, there was an 80% discount on the fixed 
charge and a tapered subsidy up to a consumption of 250 cubic meters per month, which 
was overall equivalent to a 50% subsidy on the consumption of a typical pensioner 
household in the Metropolitan Area. Eligibility for these subsidies was confined to low-
income pensioners whose energy consumption did not exceed certain threshold levels
8. A 
direct government transfer to the respective utilities covered the cost of these discounts. 
4.23  As a result of Decree 319/97, these discounts were phased out and replaced by a 
monthly transfer of US$13.50 to low income pensioners, or of US$24 for pensioners 
using natural gas in the Patagonian region. This policy is still in force today, even though 
the cadastre of beneficiaries of this subsidy has not been updated since 1997. It is 
estimated that these subsidies are mildly progressive, with a concentration coefficient of 
–0.13. 
METROPOLITAN PUBLIC TRANSPORT 
4.24  Argentina has a longstanding tradition of public subsidies to rail transport in the 
Metropolitan Area. These were preserved, but significantly reduced, following the 
awarding of concessions for these services in 1994. These are effectively supply-side 
subsidies, which ultimately benefit customers through below cost tariffs, but make no 
                                                 
8 Low income pensioners are defined as those who receive a monthly pension of less than US$67.7 per 
month, and whose other sources of income do not exceed US$16.9 per month.  
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attempt to target subsidy resources to specific customer groups. Although interrupted in 
2001, following the economic crisis, they were reinstated and substantially increased 
during 2002. 
4.25  Moreover, in May 2002, the government introduced a new supply-side subsidy 
for metropolitan bus services. This is controversial given the substantial excess capacity 
that exists in this sector, as a result of a sustained decline in the demand for these services 
during the last decade. These new subsidies are financed via a surcharge of 18.5% on the 
net price of diesel nationwide. The total cost is estimated at US$91.6 million, and 
translates into an implicit subsidy per passenger-trip of US$0.038 for the bus service, 
US$0.097 for the train service, and US$0.051 for the metro service. 
4.26  Based on the pattern of commuting journeys for heads of household in the 
Metropolitan Area obtained from the OPSM survey, it is estimated that each commuter 
receives an implicit average weekly subsidy of US$0.64. Crossing commuting patterns 
against income, it becomes evident that the absolute value of the subsidy is highest for 
the middle-income quintiles, and for those using the suburban rail network. The 
concentration coefficients show a regressive distribution, and range from +0.36 for metro 
rail, +0.16 for the buses, and +0.09 for suburban rail (Figure 12 and Table 6). 
Figure 11: Distributional incidence of metropolitan public transport subsidy 
Source: OPSM, May 2002 
Figure 12: Distributional incidence by mode of public transport in the Metropolitan Area 




















4.27  In conclusion, it is clear that current social policies for the infrastructure sectors 
have a mildly regressive distributional incidence, with concentration coefficients 
clustered in the interval from –0.10 to +0.10. The most regressive subsidies are those 
destined to finance metro rail and bus services in the Metropolitan Area, while the most 
progressive appear to be the social tariffs for water and electricity practiced by some of 
the provinces achieving concentration coefficients below –0.10
9. The errors of inclusion 
of these subsidies are uniformly high, ranging from 40% to 70%. Furthermore, the 
subsidies appear to exclude between 60% and 90% of the total poor nationwide. 
 
Table 6: Summary of targeting performance for existing social 
policies 
  Error of exclusion 
 
Error of     
inclusion  Target 
population  Nationwide 
Concentration 
coefficient 
Water Metropolitan Area (TBB)  57%  14%    +0.07 
Water Metropolitan Area (Universal 
Access Charge)  40% 0%  78%  -0.03 
Water Provinces  (Social Tariffs)  44%  73%  76%  -0.15 
Electricity (Social Tariffs)  39%  94%  93%  -0.37 
Gas  (Patagonian subsidy)  70%  64%  98%  +0.08 
Energy (Pensioners subsidy)  52%  27%  92%  -0.13 
Public transport (Metropolitan Area)  59%  0%  64%  +0.16 
Rail 57%  0%  91%  +0.09 
Bus 59%  0%  70%  +0.16 
Metro rail  73%  0%  97%  +0.36 
Source: OPSM, May 2002 
4.28  Finally, it is important to put these results in broader international perspective, by 
observing that it is not unusual for utility social policies to present high errors of 
inclusion and exclusion. For example, a recent study of water sector subsidies in Chile 
and Colombia found errors of inclusion in the 60-80% range, and errors of exclusion of 
around 80% in Chile and 30% in Colombia
10. Furthermore, a number of studies on 
                                                 
9 Given that the Gini coefficient for per capita income amounts to 0.44, it is evident that the distribution of 
subsidiesalthough regressive in absolute termsis much less regressive than the distribution of income 
in the country.  
10 Gomez-Lobo, A., and Contreras, D., ‘Subsidy Policy for the Utility Industries: A Comparison of the 
Chilean and Colombian Water Subsidy Schemes’, University of Chile, August 2000.  
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electricity subsidies in a variety of countries find that barely 10-35% of subsidy resources 
are captured by low-income households
11.  
                                                 
11 These studies include (a) World Bank (2000) Maintaining Utility Services for the Poor: Policies and 
Practices in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, The World Bank Group, 
Washington DC; (b) India Power Sector Reform and the Poor, Mimeo, South Asia Region, The World 
Bank Group, Washington DC ; (c) Foster, V. and Araujo, C. (2001) Does Infrastructure Reform Work for 
the Poor? A Case Study from Guatemala, Mimeo, Latin America and Caribbean Region, The World Bank 
Group, Washington DC.  
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5. SIMULATION OF ALTERNATIVE SOCIAL POLICIES 
 
5.1  The serious targeting deficiencies observed in existing social policies motivate the 
search for alternative targeting mechanisms that might be more effective in channeling 
resources to the poor. The basic presumption is that any alternative mechanism should be 
based on an accurate targeting device and be limited to subsistence consumption levels.  
On this basis, a variety of alternative social policy mechanisms can be conceived, each of 
which is designed to remain within the current budget envelope for infrastructure 
subsidies. Both use of service subsidies and connections subsidies (where applicable) are 
considered in the simulation exercise. 
TARGETING MECHANISMS 
5.2  In order to improve the targeting of subsidies, it is necessary to develop an 
accurate poverty proxy that can be used to identify low-income households. In Argentina, 
a number of potential targeting mechanisms have been publicly debated, including the 
use of consumption levels as a targeting device, as well as the allocation of utility 
subsidies to households that are already beneficiaries of other social programs (such as 
the Heads of Household program
12). Furthermore, provincial experience illustrates the 
possibility of developing multi-dimensional poverty proxies based on aggregating a 
number of different indicators of structural poverty. Each of these are now considered in 
turn. 
Consumption 
5.3  In order to evaluate the hypothesis that physical consumption might be a good 
poverty indicator, a simulation was conducted using data on household electricity 
consumption in the Metropolitan Area, since this was the only service and geographical 
area for which there were sufficient reliable data points on household consumption. The 
simulation explores the possibility of allocating subsidies only to those households that 
consume (successively) less than 50, 100, 150, 200, 250 kilowatt-hours per month 
(Figure 13).  
                                                 
12 The Heads of Household program is a major welfare program introduced to attenuate the impacts of the 
severe 2002 economic crisis. The program makes a monthly payment of US$67.7 to unemployed heads of 
household that participate in approved workfare schemes.  
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Figure 13: Targeting electricity subsidies based on household consumption in 
Metropolitan Area 
Source: OPSM Survey May 2002 
5.4  The results indicate that a targeting mechanism of this kind presents very high 
errors of exclusion, since about half of low income households consume above even the 
highest threshold of 250 kilowatt-hours per month. This is in spite of the fact that the data 
relate to the summer period, when electricity consumption is relatively low. The errors of 
exclusion could therefore be expected to rise during the winter period, particularly 
considering that about 20% of households in the Metropolitan Area (typically poor 
households that lack access to natural gas) use electricity for heating purposes. The errors 
of inclusion are also high, rising gradually from 40% to 50% as the consumption 
threshold increases. Given that higher income households are more likely to use natural 
gas for heating, these errors of inclusion are unlikely to improve during the winter period. 
Thus, overall, electricity consumption does not appear to be a very reliable indicator of 
poverty. 
Social programs 
5.5  In order to evaluate the hypothesis that utility social tariffs could be allocated to 
households already registered as beneficiaries of other major social benefit schemes (such 
as the Heads of Household program), the targeting properties of those schemes are 
evaluated (Figure 14). The results indicate that these schemes have very low errors of 
inclusion, typically well below 10%, and thereby succeed in targeting almost all of their 
resources to the poor. Nevertheless, the programs are relatively small in scope, and 
consequently bypass some 70-90% of low-income households nationwide
13. Given the 
                                                 
13 For the Heads of Household program targeting is evaluated based on the results of the November 2002 
OPSM Survey, given that at the date of the earlier May 2002 OPSM Survey the program was still at an 
early stage in its development. Indeed, the number of program beneficiaries increased from 533,000 in May 
2002 to 847,000 in November 2002. However, these figures do not reflect further increases in the scale of 
the Heads of Household program after November 2002.  
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fundamental importance of minimizing errors of exclusion, existing social programs do 
not appear to offer an adequate basis for targeting utility social tariffs.  
Figure 14: Targeting of existing social programs 
Source: OPSM Survey May 2002 and November 2002 
Multi-dimensional proxies 
5.6  A third alternative is to develop a multi-dimensional poverty proxy. This is done 
very much along the lines of what is currently practiced in a number of Argentine 
provinces, with the key difference that income level is not used due to the serious 
measurement difficulties that it poses. For the purposes of this study, a purely illustrative 
multi-dimensional poverty proxy is developed simply as a device for demonstrating the 
potential contribution of this approach to improving the targeting of utility subsidies 
(Table 7). 
5.7  The use of poverty proxies presents both advantages and disadvantages. On the 
one hand, they offer the possibility of reducing errors of inclusion and exclusion, as long 
as they are backed by administrative systems that are sufficiently competent and 
transparent to apply the proxy in a reliable manner. On the other hand, the use of such 
instruments can create perverse incentives for households not to improve their situation in 
order to avoid losing subsidy benefits, this phenomenon is known as the ‘poverty trap’. 
Another risk is that the use of such criteria might create ‘stigma effects’ that discourage 
eligible households from taking-up the associated benefits. Furthermore, the creation of 
the administrative apparatus needed to implement poverty proxies can become costly, 
unless a single targeting scheme can be used for multiple social programs thereby 




Table 7: Development of a multi-dimensional poverty proxy 
 
The creation of the poverty proxy is based on the search for objective and readily verifiable indicators that 
show a strong statistical correlation with household income. In order to minimize administrative costs, the 
search was limited to variables that are already collected is the Argentine SISFAM (Unique Identification 
and Registration System for Beneficiaries of Social Programs), many of which also appear in the 
commonly used index of Unsatisfied Basic Needs. 
 
The multi-dimensional poverty proxy aims to capture per capita family income, based on a weighted index 
of the following five variables, selected on the basis of being simple, objective and easily verifiable. 
 
Overcrowding (O) – More than three persons per room in the family dwelling.  
Inappropriate housing (H) – Housing in workplace, guesthouse, or shantytown. 
Unsanitary conditions (S) – Housing without bathroom, latrine, or sewerage. 
Presence of infants (I) – Presence of children under the age of five in the household.  




The weighting factors used to calculate the proxy are determined by a statistical estimation that maximizes 
the correlation between per capita household income and the five variables indicated. Different models are 
estimated for each geographic region, with results reported in Table A5 of the Annex. In order to determine 
whether a household qualifies for subsidy based on this indicator, the household’s score on the multi-
dimensional poverty proxy is compared to the official poverty (or extreme poverty) line. Those below the 
line are eligible, while those above the line are ineligible. 
 
 
5.8  However, a recent international study on the issue of targeting social programs 
concludes that programs that make use of targeting devices are able to transfer, on 
average, 25% more resources to low income households than those that do not
14. 
Moreover, in the case of better-designed programs the difference increases to 200% or 
even 400%. Nevertheless, the efficacy of targeting mechanisms differs substantially 
according to the details of implementation in each case. 
5.9  One possible means of reducing the problems associated with individual targeting 
is to target geographically, based on zones or neighborhoods that present high aggregate 
poverty indices. This approach substantially reduces the administrative costs associated 
with targeting, however its efficacy is contingent on the extent to which poor households 
are indeed clustered in particular geographical areas, which varies considerably according 
to the urbanization patterns of different cities. Without considerable spatial clustering of 
poor households, a geographic approach is likely to lead to very higher errors of inclusion 
and exclusion. 
                                                 
14 Coady, D., Grosh, M., and Hoddinot, J., 2003. Targeting of Transfers in Developing Countries: Review 
of Experiences and Lessons, Social Protection Discussion Paper Series forthcoming, World Bank, 
Washington DC.  
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5.10  The multi-dimensional poverty proxy used for illustrative purposes in this study is 
based on a weighting of five variables demonstrated to have a strong correlation with 
poverty, namely: overcrowding; inappropriate housing; unsanitary conditions; presence 
of infants; and head of household education (Table 7). This proxy is used to estimate per 
capita household income and hence to predict whether a particular household is above or 
below the poverty (or extreme poverty) line.  
5.11  The results of using this device indicate that errors of exclusion for the poverty 
proxy weighting all five indicators are substantially lower than the errors of exclusion 
associated with any one of the five indicators individually. Nevertheless, the poverty 
proxy performs substantially better at predicting poverty that at predicting extreme   
poverty, illustrating that this smaller second group is much more difficult to identify. 
Source: OPSM, May 2002 
5.12  Furthermore, the performance of the multi-dimensional poverty proxy varies 
significantly by geographic region (Figure 15). As far as poverty is concerned, the best 
targeting results are obtained in the Northeast and Northwest Regions, where poverty 
tends to be long term and structural in nature, and therefore well aligned with the 
variables used in the multi-dimensional proxy. In these cases, both errors of inclusion and 
exclusion are as low as 20%. The proxy also performs quite well in the greater 
Metropolitan Area as well as the Pampeana and Cuyo Regions. However, it does not 
perform very well for Patagonia or the Federal District, where the errors of exclusion 
climb to the 60-80% range. In the case of the Federal District, this could be explained by 
the phenomenon of the ‘new poor’ that have been created as a result of the recent 
economic crisis in Argentina. These are people who suffer from low incomes but do not 
exhibit the emblems of structural poverty  (poor housing and education). The results 
obtained for targeting extreme poverty are much less satisfactory across all geographical 
areas, particularly with respect to errors of exclusion that in all cases exceed 70%. 
Table 8: Targeting performance of the multi-dimensional poverty proxy 













Error of inclusion  19.6  27.1  10.5  32.7  39.8  39.7 
Error of exclusion  90.7  96.1  91.1  67.2  85.1  36.3 
Extreme poverty 
Error of inclusion  42.2  77.0  42.1  73.3  65.7  36.2 
Error of exclusion  82.7  95.6  85.1  83.0  56.9  76.3  
36 
Figure 15: Regional targeting performance of the multi-dimensional poverty proxy 
 
(a)  Poverty        (b)  Extreme  poverty 
Source: OPSM and EPH Surveys, May 2002 
DEFINITION OF SUBSISTENCE CONSUMPTION 
5.13  The other issue that needs to be tied down for the simulation exercise is the 
threshold to be used for subsistence consumption, since this defines the maximum 
amount of subsidy to be received by any particular eligible household. 
Water 
5.14  The subsistence consumption concept is least relevant for the water sector in 
Argentina, given that no more than 25% of households are metered. Nevertheless, some 
jurisdictions have achieved substantial levels of meter coverage, most notably the 
Province of Corrientes where penetration of 90% has been achieved. In these cases, it is 
relevant to ask what might be a theoretically defensible level of subsistence consumption. 
5.15  International practice varies widely from a threshold of six cubic meters used in 
South Africa’s free water policy, to 15 cubic meters in Chile’s water subsidy program, to 
a typical 20 (or even 30) cubic meters used in many Increasing Block Tariff structures 
throughout Latin America. The choice of threshold depends both on the typical size of 
low-income households, and on the per capita daily consumption considered necessary 
given local climatic conditions and social expectations (Figure 16). Thus, 50 liters per 
capita day (equivalent to 7.50 cubic meters per month for a family of five) is often 
considered to be an absolute minimum for survival. Whereas, 125 liters per capita per day 
(equivalent to 18.75 cubic meters per month for a family of five) is typically considered 
to provide an adequate level of comfort relative to the expectations of modern urban 
societies. Thus, a subsistence threshold of around 15 cubic meters per month would 
appear to be reasonable (Figure 16).  
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Figure 16: Determination of subsistence consumption threshold for water 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Electricity 
5.16  For the electricity sector, the subsistence consumption threshold needs to take into 
account the portfolio of energy consuming appliances considered necessary for social 
participation in any given locality (Table 9). In the case of Argentina, this approach 
suggests a threshold of 120 kilowatt-hours per month in summer, rising to 225 kilowatt-
hours per month in winter for households that use electric stoves for heating. Based on 
the household survey undertaken for this study, it can be inferred that in Argentina about 
20% of households use electricity for heating, because they live in temperate climatic 
zones and do not appear to have access either to natural gas or LPG. Since this proportion 
is relatively low, it appears to make more sense to base the subsistence consumption 
threshold on summer usage patterns, and concentrate public resources on subsidizing 
access to natural gas and LPG, which are far more efficient for household heating than 
electricity. On this basis, a subsistence threshold of 120 kilowatt-hours per month is 
proposed for Argentina. This level of consumption turns out to be very consistent with 
the actual consumption decision of low-income households that formed part of a pilot 






Table 9: Estimation of subsistence consumption threshold for electricity  
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Weekly hours of use  Consumption 
(kWh/mo.)    Capacity  
(W) 
Summer Winter  Summer  Winter 
Radio 60  5  5  1.2  2.4 
Small color television (20”)  70  20  20  5.6  5.6 
Standard fan  90  30  0  10.8   
Light bulbs  120  40  80  19.2  38.4 
Small fridge  150  120  120  72.0  72 
Semi-automatic washing machine 200  2  2  1.6  1.6 
Hair dryer  500  1  1  2  2.0 
Iron 1,000  2  2  8  8.0 
Small electric stove  1,200  0  20    96.0 
Total        120.4 224.8 
 
Gas 
5.17  For the gas sector, a similar approach is used based on the typical portfolio of gas-
consuming appliances, namely a cooking stove, a water heater, and a space heater. The 
first step is to calculate the basic monthly consumption for each of these appliances 
across summer and winter periods in the Metropolitan Area, resulting in a baseline 
subsistence consumption of 500 cubic meters per year (Table 10a). Thereafter, regional 
consumption variations are analyzed using one of three possible methods (Table 10b). 
The first approach (Method A) estimates variations in heating needs based on climatic 
differences across regions. The second approach (Method B) adjusts the subsistence 
consumption threshold for the Metropolitan Area based on historically observed 
differences in average consumption levels across geographical regions. The third 
approach (Regulatory Reference) is based on the stipulations of Resolution 2787/03 of 
the gas regulator, that establishes its own subsistence thresholds for each region. The 
results of these three methods turn out to be fairly consistent (Table 10b). Thus, the 
subsistence threshold adopted for this study is taken from the middle of the range 
established by the three methods. The only exception is the case of Patagonia where the 
most conservative threshold is adopted, due to the fact that current consumption levels 







Table 10: Derivation of subsistence consumption threshold for natural gas  
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(a) Metropolitan Area baseline 









Cooking 3,000  1.2  0.8  9 9 9  110 
Water heating  12,000  0.8  0.4  25  16  20  235 
Space heating  3,000  4.0  0.0  32  0  13  157 
Total        66 25 42  502 
5.18   
(b) Regional Adjustments 
  Annual Consumption  Annual Subsistence Consumption 











Area  1,000 401  599  502  500  500  500 
Central 1,000  360  640  468  500  500  500 
Pampeana 1,145  437  708  557  573  550  550 
Coastal 900 352  548  445  450  500  450 
Entre Ríos  950  346  604  448  475  450  450 
Northwest 700  455  245  496  350  450  425 
Cuyo 1,200  447  753  575 600  600 600 
Patagonia              
Neuquen 3,000  1,001  1,999  1,340 1,500  1,700  1,400 
Chubut   4,300  1,838  2,462 2,256  2,150  2,200  2,200  
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Public transport in the Metropolitan Area 
5.19  As already indicated, the OPSM Survey only covers head of household commuter 
journeys in the Metropolitan area. The survey does not include any information on other 
journeys undertaken by the head of household, nor any journeys undertaken by other 
household members. Moreover, given the deep recession in Argentina, some heads of 
household did not report any commuting journeys due to being unemployed. Therefore, 
for the purposes of this study, a very simple definition of subsistence consumption is 
used, equivalent to 22 return journeys to work per month for the head of household. This 
level of subsistence consumption could be guaranteed by providing some kind of free or 
subsidized bus pass, that based on current fare structures would need to take a value of 
around US$14.91 per month.  
RESULTS OF SIMULATIONS 
5.20  Based on the multi-dimensional poverty proxy and subsistence consumption 
thresholds developed above, it is possible to simulate a series of alternative social policies 
in each sector. In all cases, these simulations respect the current budget envelope for 
social expenditures on infrastructure services, and hence would require a fiscally neutral 
reallocation of existing expenditures. Two types of simulations are performed for use of 
service and connection subsidies respectively. In the case of use of service subsidies, it is 
assumed that all the resources would be spent on subsidizing the subsistence consumption 
of those households classified as eligible by the multi-dimensional poverty proxy, 
adjusting the percentage subsidy given to ensure that the overall budget constraint is met. 
In the case of connection subsidies, it is assumed that all the resources would be spent on 
a one-time fixed subsidy to unserved households classified as eligible by the multi-
dimensional poverty proxy, adjusting the number of beneficiaries each year to ensure that 
the overall budget constraint is met. 
Water 
5.21  In contrast to the other services, the water sector does not currently have any 
national financing mechanism for social policies that would allow for some degree of 
geographical redistribution of resources across jurisdictions. Nonetheless, a draft Federal 
Water Law developed in 1999 proposed the creation of such a national social fund for the 
water sector based on a 3% surcharge on water bills that could be credited against the 
sector’s VAT liability. Although this draft law was never sanctioned, this possibility 
continues to be debated within the water sector. Therefore, for purely illustrative 
purposes, the simulations presented in this study will limit themselves to the budget 
envelope associated with this proposal, which amounts to US$21.3 million per year. Two 
alternative uses of these hypothetical funds will be considered. 
5.22  The first is the introduction of a national social tariff that offers a discount against 
the minimum unmeasured water tariff for all households that qualify according to the  
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multi-dimensional poverty proxy. Given the budgetary constraint established, it would 
only be possible to finance a 10% discount on this minimum tariff. 
5.23  The second alternative is to use the resources to provide first-time connection 
subsidies for either water or sewerage services. In both cases, subsidies are limited to 
those households that qualify as eligible on the basis of the multi-dimensional poverty 
proxy. A subsidy of US$135.5 per connection is considered for water and US$203.3 per 
connection for sewerage. 
5.24  The distributional incidence of these two social policies can be compared with 
current social tariff policies practiced by a number of provinces. Although existing social 
tariff policies appear to perform relatively well in distributional terms, the proposed water 
connection subsidy performs even better, with a concentration coefficient of –0.28, as 
against –0.16 for the simulated national water social tariff, and –0.15 for the current 
provincial social tariff programs. The sewerage connection subsidy is less progressive 
than the water connection subsidy given that overall coverage levels of sewerage are 
lower and affect a broader socio-economic range of households, leading to a 
concentration coefficient of –0.16, which is the same result as for the simulated national 
water social tariff. 
Figure 17: Simulation of alternative social policies for water and sewerage 
Source: OPSM, May 2002 
Electricity 
5.25  For the electricity sectors, simulations are performed within the budgetary 
envelope of the existing Tariff Compensation Fund that provides around US$98 million 
per year. Since electricity coverage is virtually universal in urban areas of Argentina, 
simulations focus on use of service subsidies for the 120 kilowatt-hours of subsistence 
consumption of those households identified as eligible by the multi-dimensional poverty 
proxy. Two different variations of this subsidy are considered (Figure 18).  
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5.26  In the first variation, the existing provincial allocations of resources under the 
Tariff Compensation Fund are respected. However, all of the resources are devoted to 
financing the subsistence consumption of those households identified as eligible by the 
multi-dimensional poverty proxy. The resulting concentration coefficient is –0.22 
indicating a reasonably progressive outcome. The errors of inclusion and exclusion come 
to 41% and 31% respectively. Nevertheless, the fact that the existing pattern of resource 
allocation does not reflect the geographical distribution of the poor in Argentina, means 
that the percentage discount that could be financed under this simulation varies 
dramatically across jurisdictions, ranging from 2% (Buenos Aires Province) to 389% (in 
some of the smaller provinces such as Rio Negro), with a provincial average of 74%.  
5.27  In the second variation, the current provincial allocations of Tariff Compensation 
Fund resources are adjusted to make them proportional to the number of poor households 
in each Province (recall Figure 8). This adjustment barely affects the concentration 
coefficient associated with the simulation, since exactly the same poor households are 
benefiting in each case. However, it serves to reduce the variation in the percentage 
discount that can be offered across jurisdictions. Thus, poor households in the Buenos 
Aires Province would receive a discount of 14%, while those in the smaller provinces of 
the interior would receive a discount of 11%. At a national level, the average discount 
across provinces comes to 25%. Therefore, the overall effect of this change is to 
redistribute resources from the long-standing poor of the interior to the ‘new poor’ in the 
Metropolitan Area. A more detailed analysis of the effects of this geographical 
redistribution of resources can be found in Table A6 of the Annex. 
Figure 18: Simulation of alternative social policies for electricity 
Source: OPSM Survey, May 2002 
Gas 
5.28  In the case of the gas sector, three alternative uses are considered for the US$100 
million collected by the Patagonian gas fund. 
5.29  The first of these consists in the introduction of a national social tariff that 

















based on the multi-dimensional poverty proxy. The existing budgetary resources would 
allow for a 40% discount to be financed. 
5.30  However, given that almost half low-income households lack access to natural 
gas, it is difficult to justify a use of service subsidy for this service. In particular, when 
one considers that 80% of these households depend on LPG cylinders that historically 
have been two or three times as expensive per unit of effective energy as natural gas, and 
which are currently four to five times as expensive per unit of effective energy as natural 
gas. The reason for this is that the natural gas tariff has been frozen since the devaluation 
in local currency, whereas the price of LPG has increased by 60% reflecting the lower 
value of local currency. Furthermore, the 20% of low-income households that lack access 
to LPG must rely on electricity for heating purposes, which is almost twice as expensive 
per unit of effective energy as natural gas. 
5.31  Consequently, the second alternative considered is to subsidize subsistence 
consumption of LPG cylinders for those households qualifying as eligible in terms of the 
multi-dimensional poverty proxy, using the same subsistence thresholds established for 
natural gas with minor adjustments to reflect differential efficiencies of use. The 
available resources would allow for a 10% discount in the price of an LPG cylinder. 
Although this policy would appear to have a stronger social justification than the 
preceding one, it would not appear to make much economic sense to subsidize an 
imperfect substitute for natural gas, when households have the possibility of connecting 
to this superior service. Furthermore, on an administrative level, the subsidization of a 
portable commodity (such as LPG cylinders) increases the probability of subsidy leakage 
towards unintended groups. 
5.32  Therefore, the third alternative considered is to subsidize connection to the natural 
gas network in urban areas, wherever a household’s geographical location makes this 
possible. Such a policy could make a substantial contribution to raising natural gas 
coverage, given that the capital costs of connection and household conversion are high in 
relation with the payment capacity or credit access of low-income households, and hence 
tend to become a significant barrier to wider penetration of the service. Another 
substantial advantage of subsidizing natural gas connections as opposed to subsistence 
consumption of LPG is that the latter leads to a lower present value subsidy liability for 
the government, in the sense that it represents a one-time subsidy as opposed to an on-
going subsidy commitment. For example, using a discount rate of 15%, the present value 
of the connection subsidy would be no more than a third to a half of the present value of 
an LPG consumption subsidy (see Table A7 of the Annex). 
5.33  The results demonstrate that any of these three policies is much more progressive 
in impact than the existing Patagonian gas subsidy (Figure 19). The distributional 
incidence of the LPG subsidy and the natural gas connection subsidy is actually very 
similar, given that both policies affect the same target population. The connection subsidy 
presents the best concentration coefficient of –0.41, compared with a value of only –0.07 
for the simulated national social tariff scheme for natural gas, which is (however) still 
substantially better than the value of +0.08 for the existing Patagonian gas subsidy. 
Furthermore, the connection subsidy presents errors of inclusion and exclusion around 
20%, compared with 40-60% for the use of service subsidy.  
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Figure 19: Simulation of alternative social policies for gas 
Source: Simulations based on OPSM Survey, May 2002 
Public transport in the Metropolitan Area 
5.34  In the case of public transport, the simulation concerns the replacement of the 
current US$60 million per year supply-side subsidy to bus, train and metro operators with 
a subsidized bus pass scheme. Given that the multi-dimensional poverty proxy is not so 
relevant for a non-household based service, the simulation considers giving these passes 
to all those enrolled in the current Heads of Household program. 
5.35  The results show that such a policy change would significantly improve the 
distributional incidence of subsidies to this sector, lowering the concentration coefficient 
from +0.16 to –0.21 (Figure 20). At the same time, the errors of inclusion and exclusion 
would fall from around 60% to around 35%. 















Source: Simulations based on OPSM Survey, May 2002 
SUMMARY 
5.36  In conclusion, the diverse range of simulations has served to illustrate the 
potential for substantially improving the distributional incidence of existing social 
policies based on some simple changes of design. It is important to emphasize that the 
multi-dimensional poverty proxy that has been used is purely illustrative, and that more 
effective targeting mechanisms may well exist. Furthermore, the simulations report the 
theoretical maximum performance of this poverty proxy, without taking into account the 
deficiencies that are likely to be introduced once any such scheme is operationalized. In 
this sense, the results represent an upper bound on the potential targeting performance of 
the poverty proxy that has been used. 
5.37  In general, existing social policies present concentration coefficients that range 
from –0.15 to +0.15, whereas the simulated social tariff schemes based on the application 
of the multi-dimensional poverty proxy reach concentration coefficients of around –0.20, 
representing a significant improvement in some cases. However, the simulated 
connection subsidy schemes are by far the most successful in terms of targeting 
performance, with concentration coefficients in the range –0.30 to –0.40. In addition, 
these connection subsidy schemes present errors of inclusion and exclusion in the 20-
40% range compared with the 40-60% range for existing social policies. Similarly, the 
errors of exclusion with respect to the target population are reduced to the 15-45% range, 
compared with the 60-90% range for existing social policies. Moreover, the errors of 
exclusion with respect to the total population are reduced to the 30-70% range, compared 
with the 65-95% range for existing social policies. Of all the sectors considered, the gas 
sector is the one where the largest potential targeting gains could be achieved based on 
the alternatives simulated. 
Table 11: Summary of targeting performance for simulated alternative social 
policies  
Error of exclusion 
  Error of 






Water status quo (provincial social tariffs)  44%   73%  76%  -0.15 
Simulated alternatives 
National discount on minimum unmeasured tariff
* 43%    38%  56%  -0.15 
National sewerage connection subsidy  42%  0%  60%  -0.16 
National water connection subsidy  28%  0%  90%  -0.28 
Electricity status quo (provincial social tariffs)  39%  93%  94%  -0.37 
Simulated alternatives       
National social tariff scheme  (reallocation of Tariff 
Compensation Fund)
*  41%  31% 36% -0.21 
National social tariff scheme (current allocation of Tariff 
Compensation Fund)
*  41%  31% 36% -0.24 
Gas status quo (Patagonian subsidy scheme)  70%  64%  98%  +0.08 
Simulated  alternatives        
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Table 11: Summary of targeting performance for simulated alternative social 
policies  
Error of exclusion 
  Error of 






National social tariff scheme for natural gas
*  52%  44% 69% -0.07 
National social tariff scheme for LPG cylinders
*  24%  19% 67% -0.41 
National natural gas connection subsidy  24%  0%  19%  -0.40 
Public transport status quo (supply-side subsidy in the 
Metropolitan Area)  59%  0%  64%  +0.16 
Simulated  alternative       
Demand-side subsidy in the Metropolitan Area (free passes)  36%  0%  35%  –0.21 
*Subsidy targeting based on use of multi-dimensional poverty proxy limited to subsistence consumption 
threshold 
Source: OPSM, May 2002  
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6. THE COST OF A SOCIAL POLICY 
 
6.1  All the simulations presented thus far have respected the current envelope of 
budgetary resources devoted to infrastructure social policies, without questioning whether 
or not the current allocation is an appropriate one. The only objective has been to 
redistribute existing resources in the most equitable way possible. However, there has 
been no attempt to evaluate whether the resulting tariff discounts were large enough to 
resolve the affordability issue. 
6.2  In this final section, therefore, the opposite approach is taken. This begins with 
the estimation of the absolute subsidy requirement necessary to overcome concerns about 
affordability, and goes on to calculate the cost of implementing such a policy. Although 
there is no scientific method for defining an affordable level of expenditure on 
infrastructure services, the empirical analysis presented at the beginning of this paper, 
together with some international benchmarks, suggest that a threshold of 15% of income 
for expenditure on subsistence levels of water and energy is a reasonable point of 
reference. For want of a better assumption, it is supposed that this overall limit is equally 
distributed across the three services (water, electricity and gas). Thus, it is possible to 
calculate the size of the tariff discount required to ensure that no household living under 
the poverty line spends more than 5% of its income on subsistence consumption of each 
of these three services. On this basis, the total cost of the social policy can be estimated 
and compared with current expenditure levels.  
6.3 Furthermoregiven that the services under consideration are in the process of 
renegotiating their concession contractsit becomes relevant to consider not only 
affordability at current tariff levels, but also affordability in the face of potential tariff 
increases. Therefore, the effect of 10% and 30% tariff increases on the total cost of 
meeting the specified social policy objective is also calculated. 
Table 12: Cost of meeting social objectives for affordability of 
services 
Subsidy to households in 
extreme poverty assuming 
tariff increase of 
Subsidy to households in 
poverty assuming tariff 
increase of  
$m 
0% 10%  30%  0%  10%  30% 
Water 23  29  40  49  86  156 
Electricity 39  35  47  228  251  298 
Gas 6  7  10  30  49  105 
Total 58  71  97  307  386  559 
Source: Own elaboration  
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6.4  Finally, a social policy of this kind could provide subsidies to all poor households, 
or only those in extreme poverty. The analysis presented at the beginning of the paper 
suggests that the justification for subsidizing services is much stronger in the case of the 
population facing extreme poverty, than in the case of the poor population as a whole. 
Nevertheless, it was also found that the multi-dimensional poverty proxy was much more 
successful in targeting poverty as a whole, as opposed to the narrower group of those in 
extreme poverty. This suggests that it may be necessary to subsidize the entire population 
in poverty, simply to be sure of reaching the entire population in extreme poverty. 
6.5  The costs of such a social policy are estimated for each of the utility services 
under the diverse assumptions specified above. This makes it possible to examine the 
sensitivity of the overall cost of the social policy to each these different assumptions. One 
thing that becomes immediately apparent is that a policy targeting all poor households 
costs four or five times as much as a policy targeting only households in extreme poverty. 
6.6  For the water sector, if there really did exist a national social policy fund 
capturing 3% of sector turnover equivalent to US$21.3 million per year, there would be 
ample resources to finance a social tariff for those in extreme poverty, even if water 
tariffs were to increase in the range explored. However, if a social tariff scheme was 
designed to benefit all households living under the poverty line, this hypothetical budget 
envelope would yield sufficient resources at current tariff levels, but would rapidly 
become inadequate if tariffs were to increase. 
6.7  For the electricity sector, similarly, the US$33.8 million per year available under 
the Tariff Compensation Fund would be more than adequate to finance a social tariff 
scheme targeted at the population in extreme poverty, even supposing significant tariff 
increases. However, they would fall well short of the amount required to finance a social 
tariff scheme for all poor households, even at current tariff levels. 
6.8  For the gas sector, the social objective defined is not very costly to achieve in 
relation to the US$33.8 million per year available through the Patagonian gas fund, even 
if all poor households were to be targeted, and tariffs were to be raised by 30%. The 
reason for this is that relatively few poor households are connected to the gas service, and 
the price of natural gas is currently very low by regional standards due to the freezing of 
the tariff after devaluation in 2002. Indeed, the few poor households that currently devote 
more than 5% of their income to natural gas reside in Patagonia. The implication is that, 
except in the case of a broad poverty definition and high tariff increases, there would be 
significant resources left over from the Patagonian fund to finance connection subsidies 
for natural gas. 
6.9  Finally, it is equally important to simulate the cost of reaching universal access to 
water, sewerage and natural gas services. For these purposes, it is assumed that a subsidy 
of US$169.4 would be paid to each poor household connecting to the service. The total 
cost of meeting the objective would reach almost US$900 million for the sewerage and 





Table 13: Cost of meeting universal access objectives (US$) 
  Annual cost of meeting 
universal access objective in 
 
 




No. of years delay 
with existing 
resources    5 years  10 years  15 years 
Water 87.4  4
* 17.7  9.0  6.1 
Sewerage 429.3  20
* 86.1  43.2  28.9 
Gas 383.2  11  76.9  38.6  25.8 
Total 899.9    180.7 90.8  60.8 
Note: Based on a hypothetical national fund that collects 3% of sector 
turnover 
 
6.10  For the case of natural gas, resources currently available through the Patagonian 
gas fund would be sufficient to meet the universal access objective within an 11-year 
period. In practice, there are a couple of factors that could affect this estimate. First, this 
cost estimate only considers the cost of household connections and interior conversions, 
but does not consider the potential need to extend or expand the main distribution 
network. Second, the cost may be somewhat lower given that it is not feasible to install 
the service in houses that are very precariously built, which limits the extent of service 
expansion. 
6.11  In the case of water and sewerage, the resources needed to meet universal access 
are very high in relation to what might be collected through a hypothetical national fund 
based on 3% of sector turnover, so that it would take as long as 24 years to meet this 
objective. On the other hand, if only 50% of connection costs were subsidized (that is 
US$84.7 per connection), the resources of they hypothetical fund would go a lot further, 
allowing the objective to be reached within a 12 year period. 
6.12  Turning to public transport, it is estimated that the cost of assigning a US$0.67 
subsidy per day (which is approximately equal to the cost of a return commuting journey) 
to each head of household that qualifies according to the multi-dimensional poverty 
proxy, would be US$207 million per year. This is equivalent to 150% of the cost of the 
current supply-side subsidy to bus, train and metro operators. However, if this policy 
were limited to households facing extreme poverty (which is to say the bottom quintile of 
the income distribution), the associated cost would be broadly similar to that of the 




7.1  Due to their public service characteristics, the infrastructure sectors are 
inescapably social in nature, a factor that cannot be forgotten in the design of sector 
policies. In the Argentine case, an analysis of social issues facing the infrastructure 
sectors reveals that the attainment of universal access objectives remains a significant 
challenge. About 30% of the urban population lack access to sewerage and natural gas, 
while 15% of the metropolitan population lack access to water. The high capital costs 
associated with connecting to these services and installing the complementary household 
equipment presents a substantial economic barrier for low-income households without 
savings or significant access to credit. 
7.2  In addition, the recent Argentine economic crisis has substantially worsened the 
affordability of water and energy services, which currently absorb more than 20% of the 
income of low-income households, a proportion that could increase further if expected 
tariff increases are approved. This situation indicates the importance of developing a 
social tariff policy that safeguards the most vulnerable households from likely tariff 
increases, and preserves the affordability of services. The analysis suggests that such a 
social tariff scheme is particularly necessary for households facing extreme poverty, 
defined as the bottom quintile of the income distribution, but less necessary for poor 
households in general, defined as the first two quintiles of the income distribution. 
Argentina already dedicates a substantial sum of money to financing infrastructure social 
policies, currently in excess of US$203.3 million per year. However, it does not have a 
comprehensive and coherent social policy framework within which such a social tariff 
scheme might be accommodated. 
7.3  Indeed, the analysis reveals that current social policies are highly ineffective at 
channeling resources towards low-income households. In general, they present 
concentration coefficients in the –0.10 to +0.10 range, which suggests a broadly neutral 
impact on the distribution of income. Moreover, they present relatively high errors of 
inclusion in the range 40-70%, as well as high errors of exclusion that leave out 65-95% 
of the poor. These results can be explained in terms of the tendency to allocate social 
policy resources to all households resident in a particular geographical area, based in 
considerations of territorial integration without any regard to their specific socio-
economic status. 
7.4  The best targeted of the existing policies are the social tariffs for water and 
electricity practiced in a number of the provinces, and this is precisely because they are 
explicitly allocated on the basis of objective poverty criteria. These mechanisms present 
relatively progressive concentration coefficients, generally below –0.15. However, 
although they have relatively moderate errors of inclusion, around 40%, their errors of  
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exclusion remain very high at around 70%. Furthermore, this evaluation is itself an upper 
bound on the potential targeting performance of these schemes, because many of them 
are based on highly problematic income measurement procedures, whose deficiencies 
could not be readily reflected in the analysis. 
7.5  All of the above suggests the need to work towards improving the targeting 
performance of infrastructure social policies. One possible way of doing so is to develop 
a multi-dimensional poverty proxy based on objective and readily verifiable housing and 
household characteristics that are proven to have a strong statistical correlation with 
income poverty. This study develops an illustrative poverty proxy, and demonstrates the 
extent of potential targeting improvements with this type of instrument, which serves to 
reduce errors of inclusion and exclusion to around 30%. Nevertheless, it is important to 
be aware that targeting instruments of this kind also bring certain disadvantages of their 
own. These include the associated administrative costs, and potential stigma effects, as 
well as the creation of poverty traps. All of these factors may significantly limit their 
targeting performance in practice, when compared to what is possible in theory. The 
sharing of targeting instruments across social programs may help to reduce administrative 
costs. 
7.6  With a view to demonstrating potential improvements in targeting performance 
relative to existing social policies, a series of social tariff simulations are performed 
based on the use of the multi-dimensional poverty proxy to identify subsidy beneficiaries. 
All of the social tariffs considered limit subsidies to a subsistence consumption threshold 
that is carefully defined in relation to basic household needs. Another important 
characteristic of all these simulations is that they respect the existing budgetary envelope 
for infrastructure social policies, with the exception of the water sector where no existing 
national budget exists. The results indicate that using the illustrative poverty proxy, it is 
possible to reduce errors of exclusion from 60-90% to 30-40% and to achieve progressive 
concentration coefficients below –0.15. 
7.7  As well as simulating social tariff policies, the possibility of reallocating existing 
social policy resources towards connection subsidy programs (for water, sewerage and 
natural gas) is also considered. The results show that connection subsidies are by far the 
most successful in targeting resources to the poor, presenting concentration coefficients 
in the –0.30 to –0.40 range, with errors of inclusion and exclusion in the 20-30% range. A 
further advantage of connection subsidies is that they are only given once, and thereby 
reduce administrative costs and avoid the creation of subsidy dependency. 
7.8  It is also important to evaluate whether the volume of resources currently 
allocated to infrastructure social policies is commensurate with the genuine social needs 
to secure access and affordability of these services. In order to do this, it is assumed that 
no poor household should have to spend more than 5% of income to secure subsistence 
consumption of water or electricity or gas, leading to a 15% overall affordability 
threshold for the three services combined. The results show that this objective could be 
amply met based on the existing resource envelope, as long as subsidies are confined to 
households living in extreme poverty; even if tariffs were to increase significantly as a 
result of the on-going contract renegotiation process. However, if the social tariff were 
extend to all households living in poverty, the overall cost would increase four or  
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fivefold, amply exceeding existing budgetary resources (particularly in the case of 
electricity). 
7.9  Finally, the potential cost of a policy of providing a US$169.4 connection subsidy 
for new connections to water, sewerage and natural gas services by low-income 
households now estimated. The results indicate that the cost of reaching universal access 
on this basis would reach almost US$900 million for sewerage and natural gas services, 
and amount to around US$84.7 million for water. Based on the resources currently 
assigned to social policies in these sectors, this would mean a delay of 11 years in 
reaching universal access to the natural gas service. However, in the case of the water and 
sewerage services, even assuming the eventual creation of a national fund collecting 3% 
of sector revenues, this objective would take 24 years to achieve.  
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Annexes 
Table A1 : Analysis of expenditure on infrastructure services (2002 versus 1997) in US$ 
Quintiles 
 
1st 2nd  3rd 4th  5th 
Total 
November 2002 (OPSM) 
Household  resources           
Average  household  expenditure    123 158 201 255 358  218 
Average household income  97  178  237  312  559  256 
Average expenditure on infrastructure services    21.4  28  28.2  29.2  37.9  29.1 
Water and sewerage  4.67  5.1 5.7 5.4 6.8  5.5 
Electricity 8.2  11.0 10.0 9.6  11.2  9.95 
Fuels  6.5 7.3 7.9 8.1 8.9  7.8 
Telecommunications 1.9  4.4 4.4 5.9 10.9  5.79 
Public transport (Metropolitan Area Head of Household commuting 
only)  12.0 17.2 20.4 18.3 17.8  17.7 
Average household expenditure share for infrastructure (%)  16.2  15.4 13.9 12.6 11.5  13.4 
Water and sewerage  3.5 2.8 2.8 2.3 2.1  2.6 
Electricity 6.2  6.1 5.0 4.2 3.4  4.6 
Fuels  5.0 4.0 3.9 3.5 2.7  3.6 
Telecommunications 1.5  2.4 2.2 2.6 3.3  2.7 
Public transport (Metropolitan Area  Head of Household commuting 
only)  9.8  10.9 10.1 7.2  5.0  8.1 
Average household income share for infrastructure  (%)  22.1 15.7 11.9 9.3  6.8  11.4 
Water and sewerage  4.8 2.9 2.4 1.7 1.2  2.2 
Electricity 8.5  6.2 4.2 3.1 2.0  3.9 
Fuels  6.8 4.1 3.3 2.6 1.6  3.1 
Telecommunications 2.0  2.5 1.9 1.9 1.9  2.3 
Public transport (Metropolitan Area Head of Household commuting 
only)  12.4  9.6 8.6 5.9 3.2  6.9 
         
May 1997 (EPH)             
Average  household  expenditure      110 187 268 390 750  341 
Average expenditure on infrastructure services      12.5 16.6 21.3 27.1 37.6  23.0 
Water, sewerage and electricity  5.7 7.4 8.4 10.1  12.2  8.8 
Fuels  2.7 4.7 7.1 10.1  16.9  8.4 
Telecommunications and  post  3.7 4.7 5.7 6.7 8.1  5.7 
Public transport (Metropolitan Area households that declare journeys)  16.9 20.1 21.7 18.2 17.6  19.0 
Average household expenditure share for infrastructure (%)  11.3  8.9 7.9 7.0 5.0  6.7 
Water, sewerage and electricity  5.3 3.9 3.2 2.6 1.6  2.6 
Fuels  3.4 2.5 2.1 1.8 1.1  1.7 
Telecommunications and  post  2.6 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.3  2.4 
Public transport (Metropolitan Area households that declare journeys)  9.1  7.7  6.2  3.7  2.0  4.3 
Source: OPSM and EPH Surveys, May 1997 and November 2002  
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Table A2 : Analysis of subsistence basket of infrastructure services 
Quintiles 
 
1st 2nd  3rd 4th  5th 
Total 
Cost of subsistence basket            58 
Water and sewerage (minimum unmeasured charge)            13 
Electricity (120kWh/month)            13 
Natural gas (42m
3/month)            20 
Telephone (100 mins/month)            12 
Public transport (one return commuting journey per day)            44 
          
Average expenditure share for subsistence basket (%, OPSM)   12.5  9.1 8.2 7.2  5.0  7.6 
Water and sewerage  2.8 2.0 1.8 1.6  1.1  1.7 
 Electricity  3.8  2.8 2.5 2.2  1.5  2.3 
Natural gas  2.8  2.0 1.8 1.6  1.1  1.7 
Telephony  3.1 2.2 2.0 1.8  1.2  1.9 
Public transport (Metropolitan Area head of household commuting)  12.1  9.4  7.4  5.8  4.2  6.8 
          
Average income share for subsistence basket (%, OPSM)   17.1  9.3  7.0  5.3  3.0  6.5 
Water and sewerage  3.8 2.1 1.6 1.2  0.7  1.5 
 Electricity  5.2  2.8 2.1 1.6  0.9  2.0 
Natural gas  3.8  2.1 1.6 1.2  0.7  1.5 
Telephony  4.2 2.3 1.7 1.3  0.7  1.6 
Public transport (Metropolitan Area head of household commuting)  15.3  8.3  6.3  4.8  2.7  5.8 
          







Table A3 : Summary of eligibility criteria for provincial water social tariff schemes 
Area Eligibility  Benefit  Implementation 
Metropolitan 
Area 
Eligible households have 
Income below poverty line (<US$172.8) 
No more than three months payment backlog 
 




Resources are allocated to 
municipalities, who are 




Eligible households are 
Poor households led by children, pensioners or 
disabled 
Pensioners with incomes <US$33.8/month  
 
50% discount on the 
minimum charge 
Beneficiaries receive the AIPO 
voucher that can be used to pay 
water or electricity bills 
Formosa 
Concessionaire applies subsidy to low income 
neighborhoods 
 
   
Mendoza 
Eligible households have 
Small dwellings <60m
2 
Live in shanty towns 
Score Level 8 or 9 in health register 
Appropriate social development classification 
Furthermore 
If unmetered, pay minimum charge 
If metered, consume <15m
3 
 
50% discount on the 
minimum charge   
Salta 
According to ENRESP score based on  
Per capita income 




But disqualifying if 
Monthly bill >$10 
Electricity consumption >20kWh/person/mo. 
Possess more than one dwelling 
Possess a motor vehicle 
Receive TV cable service 
Receive telephone service 
 
Variable according to   
ENRESP score 
A database was created based 
on national health system 
(APS) and social benefits 
system (SISFAM) databases  
 
Santa Fe 
Eligible households are 
Low income pensioners 
Lacking telephone service 
 
70% discount on bill  Interested candidates must 




Lack sewerage service 
Lack telephone service 
Have incomes <US$101.6/mo. 
Live in deprived zones (0.9<Z<1.0) 
Have unsatisfied basic needs 
 




Are family breadwinners 
Possess a single dwelling 
Receive income US$94.8/mo. 
 




Table A4: Summary of eligibility criteria for provincial electricity social tariff schemes 
Utility Eligibility  Discount on 
fixed charge 
Discount on  
variable 
charge 
Included in bill? 
EDENOR None      NO 
EDESUR None      NO 
EDELAP None      NO 
EDEN  Individual application  Up to 40%  Up to 40%  NO 
EDES  Individual application  Up to 40%  Up to 40%  NO 
EDEA  Individual application  Up to 40%  Up to 40%  NO 
EDECAT  Consumption of up to 190 KWH/mo  -USD1.1  -  NO 
  Shanty towns (0-120 kwh/mo)  -100%  -30%  YES 
  Shanty towns (0-120 kwh/mo)  -US$3.47  -60%  YES 
EPEC  Extreme poverty (0-100 kwh/mo)  -100%  -100%  YES 
  Extreme poverty (101-150 kwh/mo)  -100%  -30%  YES 
  Extreme poverty (>151 kwh/mo)  -US$4.6  -60%  YES 
  Extreme poverty (unmeasured)  -US$3.8  -100%  YES 
DPEC       NO 
  Special Residential (0-200 kwh/mo used)  -75%  -100%  YES 
  Special Residential (201-+++ kwh/mo 
used)  -75% -75%  YES 
SECHEEP  Individual (AIPO coupon)  Variable credit  Variable credit  NO 
DGSPCH Pensioners  -50%  -40%  YES 
EDEERSA  Consumption of 1 up to 50 kwh/mo  -US$0.2  -  YES 
  Pensioners and social tariff (0-100 
kwh/mo)  -US$4.77 -  NO 
  Pensioners and social tariff (101-200 
kwh/mo)  -US$4.77 -US$0.005  NO 
EDEFOR  Pensioners and social tariff (201-300 
kwh/mo)  -US$6.7 -  NO 
  Provinces (consumption 0-150 kwh/mo)  -US$1.9  -  NO 
  Pensioners (0-125 kwh/mo)  -50%  -50%  NO 
  Residential Puna Area  -50%  -50%  NO 
 Unemployed  -100%  -100%  NO 
EJESA Low-income  families  -43%  -43%  NO 
 Low-income  families  -45%  -45%  NO 
 Low-income  families  -35%  -35%  NO 
APELP   N/A  N/A  NO 
  Low-income families (1-150 kwh/mo)  -100%  -100%  SI 
EDELAR  Low-income families (151-250 kwh/mo)  -100%  -  SI 
  Pensioners (1-150 kwh/mo)  -75%  -75%  SI 
  Pensioners (151-250 kwh/mo)  -75%  -  SI 
  Pensioners (income US$61.3-US$67.7)  -20%  -20%  NO 
  Pensioners (income US$54.5-US$61.0)  -25%  -25%  NO 
  Pensioners (income US$47.7-US$54.2)  -30%  -30%  NO 
  Pensioners (income US$41.0-US$47.4)  -35%  -35%  NO 
  Pensioners (income US$34.2-US$40.6)  -40%  -40%  NO 
EDEMSA-  Residential – Rural (0-157.5 kwh/mo)  -20%  -20%  NO 
EDESTESA  Residential – Malargue area (0-37.5 
kwh/mo)  -20% -20%  NO 
  Residential – Malargue area (37.6-175 
kwh/mo)  -30% -30%  NO 
  Residential – Malargue area (176-300 
kwh/mo)  -21% -21%  NO 
  Residential – Malargue area (301-649.5 





















































































































Observations  843 2040  5693  2263  4017  2158  2648 











Table A6 : Tariff Compensation Fund (FTC) resources and feasible social tariff 
discounts by province 
Resources allocated ($m)  Discount on subsistence consumption (%)   
Original  FTC  Adjusted FTC  Original  FTC  Adjusted FTC  
Buenos Aires  1.76  5.03  2%  6% 
Conurbano    2.36    14% 
Catamarca 3.88  0.35  100%  9% 
Federal District    2.91    100% 
Chaco 3.58 3.09  16%  14% 
Chubut 1.53 0.97  100%  63% 
Córdoba 2.59  8.26  3%  10% 
Corrientes 3.04  2.90  15%  15% 
Entre Ríos  3.85  3.15  23%  19% 
Formosa 5.64  1.14  60%  12% 
Jujuy 2.70  2.04  15%  11% 
La Pampa  3.64  0.19  100%  5% 
La Rioja  1.32  0.19  100%  15% 
Mendoza 2.65  3.73 10%  15% 
Misiones 3.72  1.52 25%  10% 
Neuquen 2.96  1.34 51%  23% 
Rio Negro  0.70  0.51  390%  72% 
Salta 2.60  2.69  11%  12% 
San Juan  2.87  2.07  16%  12% 
San Luis  2.89  0.77  41%  11% 
Santa Fé  2.17  6.36  3%  10% 
Santiago del Estero  4.46  1.43  100%  32% 
Tucumán 1.83  3.19 20%  35% 




Table A7 : Comparison of present value of alternative gas subsidies 
 Natural  Gas  LPG 






(equivalente a 391 kg) 
Price before tax (A$)  0.153/m
3 1.68/kg 
Annual expenditure (A$)  $123  $658 
PV of annual expenditure (A$)  $937  $5,006 
Connection costs (A$)  $1,326-$2,026   
PV of subsidy (A$)  $1,326-$2,026  $4,069 
Note: PV- present value at 15% discount rate 
 
 
 
 
 